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There has been significant amount of aid inflows to developing countries including Ghana, but 
these have been very volatile. Aid flows have been associated with low domestic resource 
mobilization and have reduced Ghana to a country heavily dependent on aid. The amount of 
official development assistance (ODA) inflows has fallen in recent years and has become 
unpredictable. It is general knowledge that aid has not yielded the desired benefit. In an attempt 
to improve aid effectiveness donors have used tied aid not just to promote commercial interests 
but also to target aid to particular projects that have direct links with poverty. However, this has 
not yielded the maximum benefits required. Recently, the government of Ghana and its 
development partners agreed on an aid package dubbed the multi-donor budgetary support 
(MDBS), which would ensure continuous flow of aid to finance the government’s poverty 
related expenditures.  
 
This paper examines the MDBS, with special focus on how it overcomes the problems of tied 
aid and other project support. It concludes that the MDBS is innovative and could work in 
Ghana, but it would need trust and a well-designed, coordinated effort on the part of the 
government of Ghana and its development partners. Second, its effectiveness would depend 
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crucially on measures to help reduce the debt burden, so that the government would not be 
compelled to use aid inflows to service its debt. Finally, the MDBS could be more effective if it 
did not have to operate alongside other project support.  
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Developing countries, including Ghana, have been burdened with severe resource 
problems. A number of these countries are aid-dependent (Table 1) and their fiscal and 
current account deficits are unsustainable in the face of severe debt problems. The debt 
stock is extremely high and the proportion of government revenue spent on debt 
servicing places a severe burden on many developing countries, Ghana included.1 In 
certain countries, debt servicing exceeds government expenditure on education (see, for 
instance, Osei and Quartey 2001). In an attempt to rescue the situation, donors have 
often used tied aid2 not just for self commercial interests but sometimes to facilitate aid 
effectiveness,3 but without the hoped-for results. In view of the resource constraint in 
many developing countries and the fall in ODA flows to these countries (Bulir and Lane 
2002; Alesina and Dollar 2000), donors are faced with two complementary options: 
(i) develop new or innovative sources of financing for developing countries, and (ii) 
find new ways of making aid more effective.  
The Department for International Development (DFID) and a few other donors have 
considered the latter option. The donor community and the government of Ghana have 
agreed on an aid package dubbed the multi-donor budgetary support (MDBS), which is 
aimed at ensuring a continuous flow of aid to enable the government to finance its 
poverty related expenditures. The aid is to be paid into a fund and the government has 
the prerogative to determine the priority areas on which the funds are to be spent, a 
distinct advantage over previous arrangements where a part of aid is tied. Moreover, an 
important conditionality is that the money is spent judiciously and donors must be 
satisfied that the government is pursuing the right policies before funds are released.  
Laudable as this idea may seem, it raises a number of issues, which need to be 
examined. Given that donors may consult each other, would this affect the amount of 




  1996 2001 2002 
Net ODA or official aid, US$    651 million   652 9 million  652.8 million 
Aid per capita, US$  37  32.8  32.2 
Aid as a % of GNI  9.6  12.6  10.8 
Aid as a % of gross capital formation  32.2  46.2  53.8 
Aid as a % imports of goods & services  25.5  17.7  18.6 
Net ODA as a % of government expenditure  –  34.5  - 
Debt service as a % of exports  17.4  8.4  6.6 
Source:  World Bank (2004), IMF (2002). 
                                                 
1  In Ghana, debt service as a percentage of exports was 17.4 per cent in 1996, 15.1 per cent in 2000 but 
thanks to HIPC, the debt service ratio reduced to 6.6 per cent in 2002 (World Bank 2004, also see 
table 1). 
2  Tied aid is defined in this study as project aid contracted by source to private firms in the donor 
country. It refers to aid tied to goods and services supplied exclusively by donor country businesses or 
agencies. Aid can also be tied to conditions such as policy or institutional reforms but the paper 
narrowly defines tied aid to exclude aid tied to conditions. 
3   Defined in terms of aid’s contribution to poverty alleviation or sustained poverty reduction.  2 
available to Ghana? Second, would donors restructure their aid and possibly reduce the 
grant component? Another worrying issue is that not all donors have signed up to 
support the agreement, as in the case of Japan, one of Ghana’s biggest donors after the 
World Bank (WB). This raises the assumption that Japan’s assistance would continue to 
be in the form of food aid and project support, often with high transaction costs. 
Furthermore, the multi-donor budget support would operate alongside other forms of 
project aid, raising the issue of the mix of aid. Would the mix between MDBS and the 
other forms of project aid necessarily make aid more effective? This paper examines 
these issues in the light of the current dimension of aid flows to Ghana. Section 2 
outlines the pattern of aid flows to Ghana since its independence and examines aid’s 
probable impacts on the economy. The next section considers how to make aid more 
effective, and outlines the MDBS system and its operational framework, and examines 
its likely gains. The section also discusses some of the issues raised here. The final 
section concludes. 
2  Profile of aid flows to Ghana 
Ghana currently receives aid in various forms, including general budgetary support, 
sector budget support (mainly health and education), and project aid using parallel 
systems. Until the mid 1960s, aid flows were relatively unimportant in Ghana (Harrigan 
and Younger 2000) because the Nkrumah government was highly suspicious of the 
major donors, i.e., Britain and the USA, which did not help the already poor state of 
affairs. But more particularly, the economy, as it emerged from colonial rule (Killick 
1978; Brownbridge 1994; Quartey 2002) had inherited substantial foreign exchange 
reserves, little debt, and a small public sector. Very little foreign exchange and 
budgetary support were needed until the 1961 balance-of-payments crisis (Killick 1978; 
Harrigan and Younger 2000; Quartey 2002). Although there was an interest in attracting 
aid after 1961, Nkrumah’s criticism of Britain and the USA, the two major western 
donors4 made them less attractive sources of assistance. Eventually, Nkrumah did 
succeed in attracting support from the eastern bloc but the relationship deteriorated early 
in the programme and this severely limited disbursement (Killick 1978).  
In the mid 1960s, the situation began to improve and aid inflows as a share of GDP 
increased from 0.002 per cent in 1960 to 0.22 per cent in 1965 because the new National 
Liberation Council (NLC) government, which ousted the Nkrumah administration, was 
more favourable to foreign interests (Quartey 2002). NLC agreed to reschedule the 
debts accumulated by the previous government. It sought assistance from the IMF in 
response to the balance-of-payments crisis in 1965/66, devalued the currency and 
pursued a prudent fiscal budget. Although these measures attracted increased assistance, 
most of the inflows were used to settle commercial debts contracted by the previous 
government (Harrigan and Younger 2000; Quartey 2002). 
The economic policies of the 1970s were not impressive either and aid inflows declined 
during the first half of the 1970s, but the second half recorded more than a 
compensating increase. ODA as a share of GDP increased from 0.013 per cent in 1974 
to 0.023 in 1978. According to Harrigan and Younger (2000), there were three reasons 
for this increase. First, the East and Western allies of the developed world were 
                                                 
4  Except the Volta River Project, this was partly financed by the World Bank, Britain and the USA. 3 
competing for Africa’s loyalty in the post-independence period when most African 
states began to distance themselves from their colonial powers. Second, most donors 
realized the severity of poverty in Africa relative to other developing countries and 
responded with more foreign assistance. Finally, the development community shifted 
away from the emphasis of growth being the engine for poverty reduction towards a 
more direct intervention to satisfy basic human needs. This shift weakened the link 
between aid flows and good economic policies. 
In 1972, the government of the National Redemption Council (NRC), which took over 
from the NLC government, repudiated 35 million pounds of Nkrumah’s debt and this 
brought a sharp response from commercial donors in 1973 and 1974 (Brownbridge 
1994; Quartey 2002). However, in 1975 Ghana agreed to reschedule 100 million pounds 
of its external debts and this triggered the country’s inclusion in the global flow of aid to 
Africa. However, this did not improve the country’s payments position significantly but 
rather increased the country external debt since most of the aid was in the form of 
multilateral loans instead of grants. Ghana’s foreign debt increased substantially from 
US$895 million in 1975 to US$1407 million in 1980 (Harrigan and Younger 2000). To 
make matters worse, the source of Ghana’s external financing contracted to a small 
number of donors, with the World Bank being the major donor. 
The early part of the 1980s witnessed a gradual reduction in aid flows to developing 
countries and Ghana was no exception. The nationalism of the Rawlings administration 
compounded the poor state of affairs. The economic decline at the time caused donors 
to lose hope in Ghana, but soon potential donors were eager to influence the country’s 
policymakers for a radical shake-up of its economic policies. The Rawlings government 
shelved its socialist ideologies, suspended the 1981 and 1982 annual budgets and 
instead fashioned out an economic recovery programme (ERP) in 1983, which got the 
approval of the two Washington-based institutions. Both institutions pledged their 
support and reconvened the defunct WB and IMF consultative group of aid donors. 
Pursing the economic recovery programme inspite of the hardships made Ghana the pet 
of donors.  
Aid flows had increased substantially by the end of the 1980s and Ghana was receiving 
more foreign aid per capita than the average for Africa and other developing countries. 
The added inflows coincided with increases in growth but it is not clear whether the 
increase means causation. It can be argued that the increased inflow had a positive 
impact on growth at least during the early part of the ERP (Aryeetey and Cox 1997). 
Policy conditionality of programme aid flows ensured that neither fungibility nor Dutch 
disease plagued aid inflows (Younger 1992). Harrigan and Younger (2000) argue that 
public spending in Ghana had fallen to extremely low levels and capital spending had 
almost disappeared, which enabled the government to reduce its investment spending to 
finance public consumption in response to aid inflows. Also, the inflow of aid bridged 
the gaps in foreign exchange and capital availability, thus providing support for 
reconstruction of basic infrastructure, and the imports of spare parts and capital 
equipment 
The late 1980s and early 1990s marked a new phase in Ghana’s economic situation. 
During the period, the government took advantage of the high return public 
investments; infrastructure rehabilitation and markets were functioning at a level 
comparable to the pre-ERP period (Harrigan and Younger 2000). The foreign exchange 
market was liberalized during the reform period which meant that subsequent inflows 4 
induced a foreign exchange appreciation, thus dampening the incentive to export. 
Second, the government’s attempt to neutralize the monetary effects of the inflows 
severely limited credit to the private sector (Younger 1992). Eventually the continued 
inflows led to the Dutch disease situation: exports and private investment were 
crowded-out by to tight monetary policy. 
After the 1996 elections, one constitutional requisition was the drawing up of a 
development plan. A medium-term development framework called Vision 2020 was 
prepared for the period 1997-2000 to provide a plan for the poverty reduction strategies 
of the country. Similarly, after the 2000 presidential and parliamentary elections, the 
Provisional National Defence Council Congress ((P)NDC), after being in power for 
over 20 years, lost to the New Patriotic Party (NPP) under the leadership of President 
Kufour. The policies and programmes pursued in the NPP’s development plan (Ghana 
Poverty Reduction Strategy, GPRS) were not different from those of its predecessor. 
2  Aid strategies of major donors 
Over the years, aid flows to Ghana have taken different shapes and forms. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, as aid expanded, donors also began to diversify their aid portfolios. More 
emphasis was placed on infrastructure development, the productive sectors, particularly 
agriculture, health and education as well as poverty alleviation. However during the 
1980s, there was a shift towards policy-based programme lending as opposed to 
traditional project lending, with the WB as the principal donor (Baffour 1999). This 
shift was accompanied by donor conditionality, mainly macroeconomic reforms and 
economic growth, which were implemented through stabilization and structural 
adjustment reforms. The main economic strategy was the economic recovery 
programme, which was to cover three phases, namely, stabilization, rehabilitation and 
liberalization. Thus, donor policy conditionality as well as donor-funded projects during 
the major part of the 1980s were focused on rehabilitating the deplorable state of the 
country’s social and economic infrastructure. From the mid-1980s onward, donor policy 
also included the reform of civil service, privatization as well as the creation of an 
enabling environment for the private sector (Quartey 2002). 
Unfortunately, the first phase of the ERP did very little to alleviate poverty and this 
sparked off concern over the social dimensions of adjustment. A second structural 
adjustment credit (SAC) was signed in 1989 to address the long-term issues of poverty, 
rapid population growth and food security (Harrigan and Younger 2000). Hence, the 
government and the World Bank established in the 1990s a common agenda to alleviate 
poverty. This policy became operational in 1993 when the WB proposed its own 
poverty reduction approach with enhanced investment in human capital, a better 
framework for private sector participation, and specific targeting of policies to areas 
where the poor operate, especially the agricultural sector. Another major shift in aid 
policy in the 1990s affected the sector-level strategies. The role of the private sector in 
economic development was not given priority in the ERP. The WB and its allies 
recognized that private-sector constraints had been overlooked. These had prevented the 
sector from responding positively to the ERP, particularly in terms of bringing structural 
change to the economy and diversifying exports. More support began to flow to the 
private sector, particularly agriculture. 5 
In the early part of 1999, the World Bank launched the comprehensive development 
framework (CDF) as an initiative to promote greater coordination in development 
assistance within aid-receiving countries (World Bank 2003). The aim of the CDF was 
to bring all partners of the country together to deliberate with the government on how to 
support its development agenda or programmes. In other words, the objective was to 
bring external partners together to finance the country’s development programmes 
rather than conduct numerous individual projects, most of which have no country 
ownership. Ghana was selected as one of the twelve countries to participate in the pilot 
stage. This has deepened coordination among the country’s development partners, and 
has facilitated country ownership, as is exemplified by the transfer of the Consultative 
Group (CG) meeting venue from Paris to Accra. It must be emphasized here that 
ownership is different from authorship of development policies of programmes but what 
matters most is the government’s commitment to ensure proper implementation (see 
Morrissey and Verschoor 2003). In Ghana, although authorship does not solely rest with 
the government, the level of commitment has been very high. 
The CG meetings has led to the creation of a mini-CG, which provides a regular 
framework for the government to formally meet its development partners on a quarterly 
basis under the co-chairmanship of the minister of finance and the World Bank’s 
country director. As a result, the World Bank has decentralized its operations in Ghana, 
so that it now has a country director, which has helped to speed up processing. Most 
procurement decisions (up to US$10 million for goods and US$5 million for services) 
are now made in Accra (World Bank 2003), and this, with a few exceptions, accounts 
for almost all decisions annually.  
Emphasis has still been placed on country ownership and good policies, factors which 
should make aid effective. Donors, particularly after the 2000 elections, began to be 
concerned about making aid more effective and therefore the need for innovative ways 
of improving the effectiveness of aid. After considerable deliberation, donors agreed on 
an aid policy known as the multi-donor budgetary support (MDBS), which is believed 
to lead to pro-poor policies and facilitate aid effectiveness. The MDBS is discussed 
later. 
3  Improving aid effectiveness in Ghana: tied aid or direct budgetary support 
In many developing countries, foreign aid serves as an important source of revenue. In a 
WB study on the fifty most aid-dependent countries, it was observed that the mean 
value of aid as a share of central government expenditure for the period 1975-95 was 
53.8 per cent (van de Walle 1998). This raises the question of whether this huge amount 
of money has been applied effectively? In other words, have these inflows resulted in 
significant poverty alleviation in the recipient countries? If not, we need to consider 
how to make aid more effective? Should aid be tied to specific projects or 
conditionality, or should governments be allowed to determine how aid can be 
effectively utilized within their countries without influence from donors’ commercial 
self-interests?  
Tying aid to a specific source in the donor country does not benefit the poor in the 
recipient country, and is seen as a way of pursuing the commercial self-interests of the 
donor (Svensson 2000). Consequently, the focus has shifted to direct budgetary support. 6 
The contemporary rationale is to use aid funds to support pro-poor policy, particularly 
for pro-poor expenditure patterns. The aim of this policy is not to drive government 
reforms but rather to support government policy and reforms. It is worth mentioning 
that supporting a partner government’s budget alongside IFIs loans is not a new concept 
for bilateral donors. What has changed over time is, instead, the rationale for doing so 
and the focus of the dialogue and monitoring. 
The central question is, what should the new aid policy be? Should aid policy focus on 
tied aid, or on some combination of tied and untied aid, or should the emphasis now be 
on direct budgetary support which ties aid to good domestic policies aimed at poverty 
alleviation in aid-dependent countries? Next we examine two forms of aid, i.e., tied aid 
versus direct budgetary support.  
3.1 Tied  aid 
Tied aid is defined as project aid contracted by source to private firms in the donor 
country (Svensson 2000). Tying aid to goods and services supplied exclusively by 
donor country businesses or agencies severely reduces its impact on development. Tied 
aid increases the cost of assistance and has the tendency to make donors focus on their 
commercial self-advancement rather than what developing countries need. Aid can be 
designed in many ways to pursue the commercial objectives of donors; one pervasive 
means is the insistence on donor country products. 
Others have argued that tying aid to donor-country products is common sense; it is a 
strategic use of aid to promote the donor country’s business or exports. It is further 
argued that tied aid, if well designed and effectively managed, would not necessarily 
compromise the quality or the effectiveness of aid (Aryeetey 1995; Sowa and White 
1997). This argument, however, is valid to programme aid in particular, which ties aid 
to a specific project or policy, and where there is little or no commercial interest. But it 
must be emphasized that commercial interests and aid effectiveness are two different 
things and it would be difficult to pursue commercial interest without compromising aid 
effectiveness. Development maximization should be separated from the notion of 
pursuing commercial interests. Tied aid improves donors’ export performance, and 
creates jobs and business for local companies. It also helps to integrate firms lacking 
international experience into the global market.  
On the contrary, aid recipients would agree that tied aid is costly; it distorts agreed 
priorities, burdens governments with ever-increasing recurrenting local costs and invites 
corruption (Baffour 1999). Baffour (1999) further argues that for Ghana the estimated 
price differentials between aid imports and non-aid imports translate into a total cost of 
at least US$350 million, that is, an average cost of at least US$40 million per year 
during the 1990-97 period. It is important to qualify this estimated cost. Since aid 
imports include grant-financed imports, it is to be expected that actual costs could be 
reduced. Nevertheless, the significance of the estimated costs should be seen in context. 
Over the 1990-97 period, aid imports to Ghana averaged about US$80 million per 
annum. Thus, the estimated annual cost of aid tying of about US$40 million is nearly 
half the annual average cost of aid imports to Ghana. In other words, the level of aid 
imports could have been one-and-a-half times the magnitude actually received if aid-
import prices had reflected those of non-aid imports. It is apparent that the price 
differentials imply a significant loss of essential imports to Ghana.  7 
Aryeetey, Baffour and Quartey (2003) support this finding in their microeconomic study 
on tied aid in Ghana. They note that aid-funded projects to this country would have been 
more beneficial for the communities and would have had greater impact if donor 
conditionality had not been attached, particularly in the procurement process which 
showed that 75 per cent of the projects examined were not competitively processed. 
Such an undeserved ‘monopoly’ leads to higher prices and reduces the impact of tied 
aid projects. Consequently, a significant amount of resources is lost through aid tying. 
Moreover, tied-aid projects do not strengthen local capacity because service contracts 
are usually single-sourced and do not involve local contractors. 
An important area of tied aid has been technical assistance, which often accounts for a 
sizeable proportion of the inflows. This traditional assistance in certain cases yields no 
meaningful results; resident expatriate staffs have tried in vain to superimpose 
institutions and concepts on existing social and political norms and values. The practice 
of sending expatriates to aid-receiving countries has undermined institutional capacity 
locally (Aryeetey, Baffour and Quartey 2003), perpetuated aid dependency and 
prevented developing countries from taking charge of their own destiny (Svensson 
2000). The focus should now be on true demand-driven forms of expatriate support, not 
to create employment in the donor country. 
Others have argued that aid tied to conditions is a better alternative than aid tied to a 
project which is often associated with the objective of commercial gain for the provider. 
Aid tied to good domestic policies (conditions or reforms) may positively affect 
economic growth through its influence on economic policy. Studies of Ghana have 
shown that aid makes good policy possible, and good policy promotes economic growth 
(Aryeetey 1995; Sowa and White 1997). Similarly, Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000) 
conclude from their empirical work that aid does flow to countries with good 
macroeconomic policies and that aid has a positive effect on growth in these countries. 
However, this argument runs counter to the traditional growth theory, i.e., the economy 
is efficient and policy is non-distortionary, but the argument may hold in the African 
context where certain governments have not pursued growth enhancing policies 
(Harrigan and Younger 2000). This introduces a conundrum: which promotes growth—
aid or policy? I would say both—foreign aid works in a good policy environment.  
However, the existence of isolated projects has not made aid very effective even in 
countries with good domestic policies. Isolated projects have not resulted in any 
significant or sustained reduction in poverty, particularly at the national level. 
Furthermore, isolated projects do not always have the perceived benefits of channelling 
developmental resources through local systems. The shift in focus towards direct 
budgetary support has occurred for specific reasons, including the perceived failure of 
‘money only’ instruments to drive significant domestic reforms. Also the MDBS was 
proposed because project support as the vehicle for achieving sustained reduction in 
poverty levels has failed.  
Recently, tied aid has not been well received by aid recipients or within the international 
community. Twenty-two developed countries reached an agreement in May 2003 to 
eliminate tied aid for certain categories of development assistance to the world’s poorest 
countries. Introduced by an OECD committee, the agreement compelled a participating 
donor to offer aid to a beneficiary country without obligations of utilizing the funds for 
suppliers from the donor country. The agreement recommended that aid, loans and 
grants—covering a wide range of financial and project support such as capital 8 
equipment, sector assistance and import support—should be open to international 
competitive bidding. 
In a nutshell, tied aid has been the less popular and less effective means of development 
assistance. Donors and aid recipients are more interested in reforming aid practices and 
making aid less fungible but more effective. Would the multi-donor budget support be 
the means to realize this long-awaited dream? Or does MDBS merely represent one of 
the many policy prescriptions of the donors which, more often than not, make little 
difference to poverty. The next section outlines some of the benefits of MDBS versus 
tied aid. 
3.2  Direct budget support 
Budget support is a form of programme aid. Programme aid is an umbrella term 
covering budget support, debt relief, and balance-of-payments support. Svensson (2000) 
defines direct budget support as funds channelled through local accounting systems 
directly to partner governments; it is not linked to specific project activity and is quickly 
disbursed. Budget support is a financial aid programme and may take two forms 
(i) general budget support, and (ii) specific budget support, i.e., health and education. 
General budget support refers to financial assistance or contribution towards the overall 
budget and conditionality is directed towards policy measures which relate to the overall 
budget priorities. Within this category, funds may be spent on certain sectors but there is 
no formal limitation as to where they should be spent. On the other hand, sector budget 
support comprises financial aid targeted at a discreet sector or sectors, with any 
conditionality relating to these sectors. Normally, government accounting may be 
augmented with additional sector reporting. 
4  The multi-donor budgetary support system (MDBS) in Ghana 
To overcome the problems associated with isolated projects, the development partners5 
and the government of Ghana agreed on an aid package known as the multi-donor 
budgetary support. Its main goal is to ensure a continuous flow of aid to enable the 
government to finance its poverty related expenditures. Unlike direct budget support, 
MDBS aims to harmonize the policies and procedures of the development partners 
(DPs) in order to minimize transaction costs for the recipient country. 
The Framework Memorandum (FM) was signed in March 2003 between the 
government of Ghana (GoG) and the DPs. According to the agreement, the FM will be 
supplemented with individual arrangements between each DP and the GoG but the 
contents of each individual funding arrangement is to be compatible with the spirit and 
provisions of the FM. The individual agreements, however, do not constitute 
international treaties. The MDBS is open to all development partners wishing to 
                                                 
5  Mainly, the African Development Bank, Canada, Denmark, European Union, Germany, The 
Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the World Bank. Between 1990 and 1994, the World 
Bank contributed 37.2 per cent of total ODA to Ghana while the rest contributed the following 
proportions: Canada (6.5 per cent), Denmark (1.8 per cent), EU (n/a), Germany (6.1 per cent), 
Netherlands (2.8 per cent), Switzerland (n/a), and UK (6.99 per cent). Japan was the single largest 
contributor (16.4 per cent). Computed from Harrigan and Younger (2000: 199). 9 
participate but this does not imply that all participating DPs are obligated to provide 
resources in any given year. The spirit of the FM must be respected (Framework 
Memorandum 2003). 
MDBS’s main goal is to harmonize the policies and procedures of the DPs in order to 
minimize transaction costs for the government. This is to be achieved by (i) agreeing on 
a common benchmark against which performance is assessed, (ii) improving dialogue 
between government and the development partners, and (iii) conditioning funding 
commitments and disbursements on the achievements of the agreed targets. 
The operational framework of the MDBS is to be in two stages: first, the Ghana Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (GPRS) is to detail the poverty reduction strategy of the government 
of Ghana. Second, the medium-term expenditure (MTEF) budget process provides the 
instrument for allocating resources according to the GPRS priorities and the resource 
envelope. 
Progress assessment of the MDBS is to be based on the goals set by the government 
within the GPRS. The FM stipulated that for 2003 the progress assessment framework 
be based on two matrices, namely, the MDBS policy matrix (EU and bilaterals) and the 
World Bank Poverty Reduction Support Credit. Both matrices are to be subject to 
separate arrangements, but it is hoped that all FM participants adopt the use of a single 
matrix based on the GPRS. There will be a common review process for all the DPs, and 
participants will meet according to an agreed schedule to jointly review the 
implementation and attainment of the objectives.  
Under the MDBS, the government of Ghana, subject to availability of funds, is to 
ensure the following:  
i)  implementation of the GPRS,  
ii)  that total expenditure and sector allocations effectively reflect the 
government’s poverty reduction commitment and that the budget is 
comprehensive;  
iii)  the provision of agreed reports to DPs;  
iv)  semi-annual coordination and organization of MDBS meetings, in conjunction 
with the mini-CG (section 2); and 
v)  the coordination and organization of joint assessment meetings.  
The development partners, on the other hand, would be committed to working in 
partnership with the GoG to facilitate the implementation of the GPRS through both 
direct budgetary support and complementary support provided through the DPs’ wider 
development cooperation programmes.  
The DPs would: 
i)  support the implementation of the GPRS by advising the government of 
planned budget support with indicative commitments for the following years. 
However, actual commitments are to be identified in individual bilateral 
arrangements between each DP and the GoG;  10 
ii)  work towards achieving the goal of a programmatic approach within a 
common framework; and  
iii)  endeavour to coordinate the timing of disbursements to government’s 
budgetary requirements. 
The FM outlines provisions for settling disputes, and differences arising with regard to 
the MDBS are to be settled through dialogue and consultation between the GoG and 
DPs. The government and each DP are to consult with other FM participants whenever 
there is discussion to suspend or terminate all or partial support to the GPRS. If a DP 
takes action to invoke remedial measures or withdraw support, the GoG, in consultation 
with other DPs, would make necessary programme revisions to ensure that the 
expenditure framework matches available resources. 
Another key feature of the MDBS is the provision of technical assistance. The DPs have 
proposed a flexible and responsive technical assistance programme, which allows the 
GoG to identify, budget, monitor and evaluate technical assistance. The unique feature 
is that all technical assistance is to be programmed and budgeted for in a manner similar 
to any other resources, regardless of the source of funds. 
Since the signing of the FM, the DPs have started providing support towards the GPRS. 
In June 2003, as part of its contribution under MDBS to Ghana, the World Bank made 
US$125 million available for disbursement in one tranche in July to support the 
implementation of the agreed poverty reduction reform programmes stipulated in the 
GPRS and the 2003 budget. The reform programmes are grouped into three broad areas: 
(i)  promoting growth, incomes and employment; (ii) improving service delivery for 
human development, and (iii) improving governance and public sector. 
Given that the conditions have been set for the MDBS to become operational and the 
funds have started to trickle in, would the MDBS make any significant in-roads towards 
poverty alleviation? The next section examines the likely gains to be derived from the 
MDBS. 
4.1  Possible gains from MDBS 
The multi-donor budgetary support system—if properly planned, coordinated and well 
implemented—is likely to offer considerable benefits. 
Off-budget spending6 
The MDBS would minimize off-budget spending which usually occurs because of 
inadequate government-partner planning for re-current expenditures. Off-budget 
spending is common in aid-dependent countries, where a number of specific projects, 
especially within the health and education sectors, are financed by donors through 
sector ministries. This makes it almost impossible for the government to track these 
expenditures and they often distort the national budget. However, with MDBS, a part of 
the donor inflows are put into a consolidated fund to be used at the discretion of the 
                                                 
6  Defined as ‘below the line’ expenditures of donor funds given to sector ministries of a country. These 
expenditures are not incorporated in the national budget and audited reports are not sent to the 
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government to finance the development expenditures outlined in its poverty reduction 
strategy paper (PRSPs) or national budget. Hence MDBS synchronizes aid flows and 
private flows. Furthermore, donors can help set up a common mechanism for 
coordinated delivery of programme aid. This in turn minimizes the off-budget spending 
and eliminates distortions created within the aid delivery system.  
Using local capacity systems 
The MDBS is gaining popularity because it utilizes local systems and capacity, helping 
to build local potential. More often than not, governments are faced with an absorptive 
capacity constraint for project aid. In Ghana, the administrative capacity of certain 
ministries, departments and agencies is weak due to the lack of skilled personnel. 
Project aid often worsens the already poor state of affairs, attracting key people as a 
result of better pay and other factors not prevalent in the civil service. MDBS, on the 
other hand, offers the opportunity to utilize the accounting systems of partner 
governments, encouraging staff to remain at their posts and strengthening local skills. 
Some partners of the MDBS system in Ghana, e.g. DFID, have indicated their 
willingness to complement budget support with technical assistance to improve local 
audit systems.  
Transaction costs 
Projects aid is often hindered by high transaction costs because submitting separate 
reports on a range of donor-funded projects is costly. Also, numerous meetings between 
government officials and donors can be time-consuming and significantly add to the 
cost of aid. For instance, donors fund over sixty thousand development projects and 
programmes globally, for which separate and timely reports are required for each donor, 
often exceeding the capacity of the aid-receiving countries. This shortcoming can be 
avoided with MDBS since it applies a unified approach that does not require separate 
reporting. With MDBS, individual systems and procedures are simplified and donors 
agree on a common format with regard to content and frequency, so that a single 
periodic report per project is sufficient to meet the requirements of all partners. To 
achieve this, donors would need to simplify their monitoring and reporting systems. 
Country ownership 
Project aid is generally made up of different projects funded by different donors. This 
often comes with very little country ownership and may not support the government’s 
priorities. However, with budget support, there is greater opportunity for donor 
coordination in supporting government priorities and allowing the government a greater 
degree of ownership. But would MDBS lead to country ownership of government 
policies and programmes? A programme is classified as country-owned if the objectives 
and policy choices of the recipient of aid are prioritized and implementation is expected 
to be a function of ownership. However, where donor objectives dominate, aversions 
are likely to be strong. In the case of Ghana, would the donor community allow the 
government’s poverty reduction strategies and policies to dominate within the MDBS 
framework or would the objectives of the donor be moulded into future policy 
documents (as has been the case with the GPRS)? 
It is strongly suggested that policies of aid receiving countries should be the main 
poverty reduction strategy within the MDBS. In a WB study of 81 adjustment credit 12 
cases, Johnson and Wasty (1993) find that ownership was a significant factor in 
programme outcomes. In the absence of local ownership, governments evade 
commitments and renege when the opportunity arises. In the case of Ghana, the GPRS 
is the main policy strategy for the MDBS and therefore ownership rests solely with the 
government, although there were reported incidences of donor influence during the 
design stage. 
Donor influence and policy change 
Donors want to influence the targeting of public expenditure towards the poor and at 
times towards more general economic and social reforms. Donors, therefore, use 
conditionality to influence policy change. Killick (1998) identifies two types of policy 
conditionality. One is the hard core conditionality, i.e., the policy changes to be 
introduced as a prerequisite to assistance. In this case, conditionality may be viewed as 
the use of monetary power to promote donor objectives. Pro forma conditionality, on 
the other hand, refers to mutually agreed or non-significant or formalistic provisions, 
which both parties find convenient to include in a programme. 
The 1980s saw a remarkable increase in donor conditionality in developing countries 
(discussed in section 2). But the high-conditionality adjustment programmes of the IMF 
and World Bank have had minimal positive outcome, even though their general 
approach to policy elsewhere has been associated with remarkable economic 
performance. It can be argued that there is little that donor conditionality7 can achieve if 
the willingness to take action is missing; conditionality then is superfluous and counter-
productive because it undermines local ownership—exactly the kind of situation that the 
MDBS process in Ghana aims to avoid. Conditionality under the MDBS needs to be 
transparent; its intentions are to be made clear to the relevant spending agencies and 
above all, the government must have the effective means to monitor expenditures and 
budgetary processes. 
The key issue, however, in the minds of the Ghanaians, is the extent to which the 
MDBS would allow donors to influence policy. Would donors be able to use their 
financial power to influence policy? Could MDBS minimize the occurrence of policy 
reversals like the withdrawal of the 20 per cent import duty on rice and poultry? Or 
would donors continue to dictate policies such as the sale of Ghana Commercial Bank?  
Predictability of aid flows 
Aid flows to developing countries are unpredictable and very volatile. There are diverse 
views on the effects of aid volatility on the government’s fiscal behaviour and growth. 
Lensink and Morrissey (1999) find that the effect of aid on growth is insignificant 
unless some measure of aid uncertainty is factored into the analysis. In a related study, 
Lensink and Morrissey (2000) argue that aid volatility is likely to substantially attenuate 
the growth effects of aid. Gemmell and McGillivray (1998) also find that aid shortfalls 
are usually followed by a reduction in government spending, increases in taxes, or both. 
In an empirical study, these authors find aid to be significantly more volatile than fiscal 
revenue. Collier (1999), on the contrary, finds aid in Sub-Saharan Africa to be less 
volatile than tax revenues as well as counter-cyclical.  
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A related study by Bulir and Lane (2002) argues that while all revenues are subject to 
some degree of uncertainty, the magnitude of uncertainty for aid is somewhat different 
from that of domestic tax revenue. The magnitude tends to be higher in the case of 
Ghana and this has repercussions on pro-poor expenditure. It is worth mentioning that 
the difference lies in the spending processes of donor countries and the design of 
conditionality. Aid inflows to aid-dependent countries have become unpredictable and 
tend to distort the government budget. Shortfalls in aid inflows have become more 
frequent, and this questions the consistency of donors. Much of the support is allocated 
different ‘pots’ and aid recipients are unable to meet the donor requirements and 
conditionalities to trigger disbursement (Aryeetey and Cox 1997: 76).  
In Ghana, delays and shortfalls in donor inflows have forced the government to cut back 
on development expenditures. At times, the shortfalls have resulted in unplanned 
domestic financing or in non-concessional external borrowing, with serious 
repercussions on future budgeting. Table 2 shows that, except for 2001 when shortfalls 
in inflows were less than 2 per cent, volatility in expected inflows has been very high.  
Table 2 
Actual and projected inflows to Ghana (billions of Cedis) 
Years  Actual inflows   Projected inflows  Shortfall (%) 
1999 1275.0    1498.1  17.5 
2000 2385.5  2978.9  19.9 
2001 3739.4  3784.6  1.2 
2002 2868.6  4706.3  39.1 
Source:  Government of Ghana’s Annual Budget Statements, 1998-2003 
Pro-poor budget setting 
Projects aimed at poverty alleviation often have limited impact outside the project area 
and target group. Hence, budget support, which works hand in hand with dialogue, aims 
to re-shape the budget setting process in favour of the poor by planning the budgets 
better, and ensuring that expenditures are related to resource availability and outputs. 
This will help to re-shape government spending towards the poor (Foster and Fozzard 
2000). Budget support can also introduce conditions to help protect the social services 
and, more generally, pro-poor measures. 
4 Conclusions 
The paper examines whether the multi-donor budgetary support in Ghana is a better 
alternative to tied aid in influencing aid effectiveness. It argues that Ghana had received 
significant amounts of foreign inflows, particularly during the 1980s, which had 
resulted in modest growth and poverty reduction. In order to increase aid effectiveness, 
the government of Ghana and its development partners have agreed on a framework 
memorandum, which would eliminate some of the problems associated with aid, such as 
tied aid and other project support. The multi-donor budgetary support (MDBS), as it is 
called, might reduce transaction costs, take advantage of donor accounting systems to 
build local capacity, promote country ownership of policies and programmes, ensure 
pro-poor spending and above all make aid inflows more predictable. Commendable as 14 
this may seem, there are a number of issues that need to be solved to make the 
programme effective.  
First, the MDBS is to operate in tandem with other forms of project aid. The problem 
with this arrangement is that the mix between the MDBS and other forms of project aid 
would not reduce transaction costs significantly enough to make aid very effective. 
There may be some gains but the benefit would be much greater if aid policies were 
synchronized so that other forms of project support were to operate similarly to the 
MDBS. Second, not all donors have signed the agreement, including Japan, one of the 
biggest donors. Japan may wish to continue providing food aid and other forms of 
project support, which often have high transaction costs.  
Equally disturbing is the fact that there is very little information in the Framework 
Memorandum to indicate that the MDBS could make aid inflows more predictable. Aid 
volatility is a major factor of aid ineffectiveness. This therefore introduces the question 
of how would the MDBS make aid more effective. Another concern is the fact that 
donors are likely to be influenced by one another. In ‘comparing notes’, they may 
restructure their aid and possibly cut down on the grant component. So far, this scenario 
has not happened; the first move, made by the World Bank, was generous. 
In conclusion, the MDBS concept is innovative and could work in Ghana, but this 
requires trust, as well as a carefully designed and coordinated effort on the part of the 
government and the development partners. Moreover, the success of the MDBS depends 
crucially on measures to reduce the country’s debt burden; without these, Ghana would 
be compelled to use inflows for debt service. It is also suggested that policy 
conditionality should be limited to issues that arise from the country’s own poverty 
reduction strategies. In other words, policies should be focused on the GPRS8 so as not 
to provide grounds for the government to renege on the agreement. Another important 
issue needing careful consideration is the fact that the disbursement of loans, 
particularly the second tranche, is based on the government complying with the ‘trigger’ 
or conditionality, but given that this coincides with elections year, would the MDBS 
ensure a guaranteed inflow? Finally, the MDBS should minimize donor influence, 
especially on policy reversals. 
                                                 
8  Both the budget setting process and the preparation of the GPRS involves Parliament. However, it has 
been argued many times that the PRSPs went through series of modifications by the IMF and the 
World Bank before they were officially accepted. This creates a divide between authorship and 
ownership and if government is not committed then the programme becomes ineffective. See 
Morrissey and Verschoor (2003). 15 
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